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1 INTRODUCTION
The European Commission has created momen-
tum around the idea of a European Capital Mar-
kets Union (CMU). The expression was first used
by then Commission president-elect Jean-Claude
Juncker in the initial exposition of his policy
agenda in mid-20141. Since then, CMU has been
prominently included in the title and job descrip-
tion of the Commissioner for financial services –
or to give him his full title, the Commissioner for
Financial Stability, Financial Services and Capital
Markets Union2. The Commission published a
green paper on CMU in February 20153. The
announcement of CMU as a policy priority has
elicited a number of substantial contributions
from a variety of stakeholders, both before and
after the publication of the green paper4.
This mirrors a broader shift in the European
policy consensus. At the outset of the financial
crisis in 2007-08, European policymakers often
described the bank-based nature of Europe’s
financial system as a factor of stability, in contrast
with the more exotic features of finance in the US,
such as securitisation conduits and other forms of
‘shadow banking’. However, Europe's dependence
on banks and the scarcity of alternative financing
channels have since been identified as significant
features of the European crisis and obstacles to
its resolution5. The president of the European Cen-
tral Bank (ECB) illustrated the new consensus by
observing that “the crisis has shown the draw-
backs of over-reliance on a bank-centred lending
model. So we also need to develop reliable
sources of non-bank lending, such as equity and
bond markets, securitisation, lending from insur-
ance companies and asset managers, venture
capital and crowdfunding”6. In the debate on CMU,
the reference to ‘capital markets’ is often used as
shorthand for such sources of non-bank lending,
and is preferred to the expression ‘shadow bank-
ing’, which has more negative undertones.
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This shift is welcome from an economic-policy
standpoint. Capital markets play an important role
in sharing economic risks and smoothing con-
sumption and investment. They can provide better
access to funding. A well-designed CMU agenda
should also make a substantial contribution to
financial stability. The prior preference for bank-
based finance ignored the advantages of a diverse
financial system and the risks associated with the
near-absence of alternative financing channels. It
also led to insufficient development of forms of
financing that are specifically suited for high-
growth firms that are major potential creators
European jobs7. During the crisis, over-reliance on
banks was an obstacle to swift repair of the Euro-
pean banking system, and it exacerbated sudden
stops and cross-border divergences in bank fund-
ing costs.
The debate will benefit from a clear articulation
of the CMU’s objective. We suggest that the CMU
agenda should aim to enable access by EU eco-
nomic agents to the best-suited possible financ-
ing options, while safeguarding financial stability.
This definition highlights major differences, in par-
ticular, with the banking union which is currently in
a phase of implementation. The definition indi-
cates that the CMU focus is not the financial sector
but the broader European economy. Stability con-
cerns are not the primary driver, but only a check
on the development of CMU. Institutional issues
are not at the core of the CMU project, even though
institutional changes might be necessary to reach
its aims. Its geographical scope is not centred on
the euro area, but extends to the entire EU (see
below). Last but not least, it is not triggered by
crisis-management challenges, but is part of a
broader long-term agenda of structural reform at
the EU level. Banks play a vital part in capital mar-
kets, even in systems in which non-bank finance
is comparatively more developed than in the EU.
Thus, well-designed policies for banks and capital
markets can be mutually reinforcing.
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The CMU agenda connects with a long history of
EU capital-market building. Starting from the
Treaty of Rome’s expression of the freedom of
movement of capital in 1957, major milestones on
this historical path include the elimination of
restrictions on capital movements in 1988; the
Financial Services Action Plan of 19998, initiated in
the wake of Europe’s Economic and Monetary
Union (EMU) and mostly implemented in the early
2000s; and the creation of European Supervisory
Authorities (ESAs) in 2011, and new impetus
given towards a ‘single rulebook’, following the
Larosière Report of February 20099. This histori-
cal continuity also suggests that, to deserve its
labelling as a genuine ‘union’, the CMU agenda
should go beyond the mere extension of pre-exist-
ing initiatives, even if these are important and
helpful. It must envisage high-impact new steps
that would trigger measurable progress towards
its stated objective.
The CMU agenda is for the entire EU. The notion
of a single market for capital10 aligns with the EU’s
internal market policy framework. Various analy-
ses have identified specific benefits of CMU for the
euro area, particularly in terms of risk-sharing11.
While these benefits are an important motivation
for CMU, they do not analytically imply that the
project should or even could be executed at the
euro-area level. On the contrary, the dominance of
the City of London as Europe’s capital markets hub
(see next section) makes it impractical and unde-
sirable to envisage a policy framework that would
be limited to a subset of EU member states. The
UK government has welcomed the announcement
of CMU and signalled its intent to engage actively
in its shaping12, in sharp contrast with banking
union, which the UK government also welcomed
but on the condition of not taking part. Envisaging
a CMU that would not include the UK or other non-
euro-area member states would be economically
counter-productive13.
As a contribution to shaping the CMU agenda, we
suggest an analytical framework and a vision for
policy. We present facts about EU capital markets
(section 2), issues that should be taken into
account in the development of CMU policy (section
3), corresponding policy options over the medium
to long term (section 4) and suggestions for policy
implementation and sequencing (section 5). 
8. European Commission
(1999).
9. European Commission
(2009).
10. See Coeuré (2014).
11. See eg Anderson et al
(2015), Coeuré (2014) and
Martinez and Philippon
(2014).
12. See, for example, quote
from UK Chancellor George
Osborne in Marion Dakers,
‘Europe launches blueprint
for capital markets union’,
The Telegraph, 19 February
2015.
13. The only qualification
would be about some lim-
ited aspects of the CMU
agenda on which the legal
basis would require una-
nimity, and this would not
be achievable across all EU
member states. Such
aspects, eg proposals in
section 4 about taxation
issues, might best be
addressed through
enhanced cooperation.
2 ASSESSING THE EU’S CAPITAL MARKETS
When analysing financial intermediation and cap-
ital markets, three perspectives are useful: the
perspective of the demand for finance from cor-
porations, households and governments; the per-
spective of financial intermediaries; and the
perspective of asset owners such as savers or
investors. All three are important in understand-
ing differences in capital-market structures in dif-
ferent jurisdictions. They are equally important in
identifying the challenges the EU faces when pro-
moting the development of capital markets.
The magnitude and composition of financial
intermediation are substantially different in
major economies. Figure 1 shows the EU’s large
banking sector, while in the US, debt securities and
stock markets play a major role in financial inter-
mediation. China’s financial system is still sub-
stantially smaller than the EU/US financial
systems while the structures of the Japanese
financial system place it between the US and EU.
The funding of the corporate sector is substan-
tially different in different jurisdictions. Only a
part of the financial system provides intermedia-
tion to the non-financial corporate sector, and the
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Figure 1: Size of the ﬁnancial sector and capital
markets (% of GDP)
Sources: Bruegel based on IMF World Economic Outlook, World
Bank, Association for Financial Markets in Europe (AFME),
Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association
(SIFMA), Asian Bonds Online, China Banking Regulatory
commission, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System, European Central Bank, Bank of Japan, China
Statistical Yearbook, and World Federation of Exchanges. Note:
All data refer to end 2014 except EU: equity market (end
2012), Corporate and government debt securities (end 2013)
and Japan: Banking sector assets (end 2013).
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The structure of financial intermediation
changes slowly. The way non-financial corpora-
tions fund themselves tends to be stable over
time (Figure 3). In the United States, for example,
the percentage of equity in total corporate fund-
ing has remained almost unchanged in the last 30
years. However, bank credit has become less
important and was partly replaced by securitisa-
tion (Figure 4). In both the UK and the euro area,
equity financing has gradually lost importance
while bank lending became significantly more
important until the beginning of the crisis. 
There are substantial differences in the funding
models in different EU countries, with bank lend-
ing, securitisation, corporate bonds and equity
playing very different roles (Figure 5). 
The EU financial system remains national; cross-
border integration is limited. Retail banking has
remained largely national with few cross-border
loans and limited cross-border ownership of sub-
sidiaries, depending on the country (Figure 6).
Wholesale banking became integrated before the
crisis but has since lost its cross-border importance.
Cross-border corporate bond holdings declined sub-
stantially during the crisis, but recently increased.
The home-bias in equity remains substantial, with
64 percent of EU equity holdings and 61 percent of
euro-area equity holdings being of domestic origin.
Capital markets can play an important role in
spreading economic risk across different regions
way the corporate sector is funded is substantially
different in different jurisdictions (Figure 2). EU
companies, like their Japanese counterparts, rely
more strongly on bank credit, while US companies
rely more on equity financing, corporate bonds
and securitisation. In China, corporate credit mar-
kets remain comparatively underdeveloped. 
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Figure 3: Size of diﬀerent ﬁnancial intermediation channels to the non-ﬁnancial corporate sector as
share of total ﬁnancial intermediation
Sources: Panel 1: US Bureau of Economic Analysis, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Securities Industry and
Financial Markets Association (SIFMA), World Federation of Exchanges. Panel 2: Eurostat, World Bank, Association for Financial
Markets in Europe (AFME), European Central Bank; * Equity refers to 2012. Panel 3: World Bank, Office for National Statistics, Bank
for International Settlements, Association for Financial Markets in Europe (AFME), European Central Bank; * Equity refers to 2012.
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Figure 2: Size of ﬁnancial intermediation to the
non-ﬁnancial corporate sector (% of GDP)
Source: Bruegel based on IMF World Economic Outlook, World
Bank, Association for Financial Markets in Europe (AFME),
Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association
(SIFMA), Asian Bonds Online, OPPLand Corporation, Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve System, European Central
Bank, Bank of Japan, China Statistical Yearbook and World
Federation of Exchanges; *securitisation is non-financial
corporate sector in the US (Commercial Mortgage backed
securities) and the EU (Commercial Mortgage backed
securities as well as SME securitisation) and total
securitisation for China and Japan. Note: Data refers to: US:
2014; EU: 2013, except equity market (2012); China: 2014,
except non-financial corporate bond market (2012) and bank
loans to companies (2012); Japan: 2014.
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14. See Sorensen and
Yosha (1998), Bijlsma and
Zwart (2013), Allard et al
(2013), European
Commission (2015b).
and jurisdictions. A substantial body of literature
provides evidence that well-integrated and deep
capital markets can spread country and region-
specific risk, smoothing the impact of deep reces-
sions on consumption and investment (Figure
7)14. Such economic risk sharing requires sub-
stantial cross-border equity holdings in particular.
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Figure 4: US and European securitisation outstanding (US$ billions)
Source: Bruegel using SIFMA. Note: European volumes include transactions from the European Economic Area (EEA) countries and
certain non-EEA countries located on the geographic European continent (Turkey, Kazakhstan, Iceland, Georgia, Russian Federation).
Whole business securitisations (WBS), commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS), small and medium-sized enterprise
securitisations (SME), other asset-backed securities (ABS) collateralised debt obligations (CDO), residential mortgage-backed
securities (RMBS), Agency collateralised mortgage obligations (Agency CMO), Agency mortgage-backed securities (Agency MBS).
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Figure 6: Share of assets held by foreign banks (in %)
Source: European Central Bank. Note: Foreign banks are defined as subsidiaries and branches that are controlled by either an
EU or a non-EU parent that is ‘foreign’ from the reporting country's point of view.
15. Criscuolo et al (2014).
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banks a greater role in financial intermediation
in the EU than in the US.
The different savings patterns also have impor-
tant implications for maturity transformation.
The maturity structure of savings in the US and the
EU is substantially different: US savers invest a
much larger share of their savings in assets with
long maturities, including equity, life insurance
and pension funds, while EU savers invest in
instruments that are easily accessible such as
deposits. As a consequence, the financial system
has to provide different levels of maturity trans-
formation in the different jurisdictions if it wants to
achieve the same funding structure of corporates.
Rather than small and medium-sized enterprises
(SMEs) in general, it is young, high-growth com-
panies that play the central role in EU job cre-
ation. It is often mentioned in policy debates that
more than 65 percent of EU employment and
more than 55 percent of EU value added is con-
tributed by SMEs . But it is even more important
that young firms, as opposed to older companies,
are the true engines of job creation. According to
OECD research, about half of all new jobs are cre-
ated by young firms, and these young firms have
always been net job creators throughout the busi-
ness cycle (with high-growth firms playing the
most important role), even during the financial
crisis15. Hence, if creating jobs is a key goal, the
financing and growth of such young, high-growth
firms is a central challenge for the EU.
Most SMEs will continue to rely on bank funding,
but securitisation and non-bank credit could
play greater roles to improve funding of larger
SMEs. The role of SMEs in capital markets is
minimal. They predominantly rely on bank lending
for their funding (Figure 9 on the next page). To the
extent that bank lending is a constraint because
of limits to banks’ balance sheets, securitisation
could free up additional lending. The securitisation
market for SMEs is particularly strong in Spain and
Italy. However, it serves more to create assets
eligible for the collateral operations of the ECB
than to free up banks’ balance sheet capacities.
Most of the newly issued securities are retained
(Figure 10). Developing a more dynamic market
for creating and placing SME credit as securities
could be a helpful avenue to improve funding for
Funding models are not only determined by the
behaviour of corporations but also by the behav-
iour of savers. When savers invest significant
amounts of their savings in equity, then funding
with equity becomes easier for corporations. Con-
versely, if savers put their money mostly into bank
deposits, banks tend to play a greater financial
intermediation role. EU households predomi-
nantly save in deposits while US households pre-
dominantly save in shares, life insurance and
pension funds. Figure 8 shows that EU house-
holds save much less in bonds, stocks and insur-
ance than US households. Instead, they have
more than 40 percent of their financial wealth in
the form of deposits. Also, the level of financial
wealth is very different in the EU and the US. As of
2012, the average household in the EU15 (before
the 2004 enlargement) held €39,160 in net finan-
cial wealth, while the average US household held
€110,227. The different savings patterns give
-10
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Figure 7: Risk sharing (% of shock smoothed by
the diﬀerent channels)
Source: IMF (2013), Figure 2.
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Figure 8: Financial portfolio of households in the
EU and US (in % of total ﬁnancial assets)
Source: OECD (2011).
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16. This point is further
developed in Philippon and
Véron (2008).
17. European Banking
Authority (2014).
18. Bruegel calculations
based on the Triennal Cen-
tral Bank Survey of foreign
exchange and derivatives
market activity in 2013,
available at:
http://www.bis.org/publ/rpfx
13.htm.
cent of highly-paid financial executives in the EU
are based in the UK. The next most significant
group is in Germany, representing only 6 percent
of the total17. Similarly, the UK's share of total
derivatives transactions in the EU rose from 61
percent to 77 percent in the 15 years to 2013
(London’s share in the global total also rose during
this period, from 33 to 43 percent). As of 2013, the
next largest share in the EU was France's, at only
7 percent of the EU total18.
3 ANALYTICAL TAKEAWAYS
Because the structure of financial systems
changes slowly, CMU should not be seen as a
‘quick fix’ substitute for repairing the bank-lend-
ing channel where still needed. To revive eco-
nomic growth and investment in the short term,
policymakers are right to rely on ECB monetary
policy measures, including the quantitative easing
programme started in March 2015; on the work by
the European Single Supervisory Mechanism and
Single Resolution Board to repair banks’ balance
sheets and achieve a return of trust to Europe’s
banking sector; and on initiatives to boost invest-
ment, such as the Juncker investment plan at the
EU level and national confidence-building meas-
ures. Even though an assessment is not within the
scope of this paper, these actions all have growth-
and job-boosting potential in the short-term. By
contrast, hopes that CMU would play a meaning-
ful role in EU economic recovery from the crisis are
likely to be disappointed.
CMU should be designed and thought of as struc-
tural and long-term transformation of financial
intermediation in the EU. It cannot serve as a
short-term stimulus to boost finance. Rushing it
through subsidies or tax or regulatory privileges
will be distorting and ultimately counter-produc-
tive and should be avoided. What counts is to
create the right framework conditions so that the
new financial ecosystem can develop at its own
pace, which will be gradual.
The two objectives of enhancing capital markets
development and of fostering cross-border
financial integration are distinct and might
require different policies. Europe’s financial
system can be characterised by two fundamental
features. First, capital market finance is compara-
SMEs. Realistically, however, this would only make
a difference for a minority of larger SMEs, given the
idiosyncratic nature of SME credit risk and the cost
of documenting securitisation. Beyond
securitisation, service innovators that do not have
tangible collateral to pledge need access to high-
risk forms of credit such as mezzanine and
high-yield debt, which are typically not offered by
traditional banking16.
Financial services tend to concentrate in hubs.
In the EU in particular, wholesale financial activity
is already highly concentrated in London, and if
anything, the recent years of crisis appear to have
accelerated the concentration because banks
have been forced to restructure their less-efficient
activities. A recent survey suggests that 77 per-
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Figure 9: Sources of SME ﬁnancing in the past
six months (% of EU28 SMEs)
Source: Bruegel based on European Commission, SAFE 2014.
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
19
99
20
01
20
03
20
05
20
07
20
09
20
11
20
13
20
00
20
02
20
04
20
06
20
08
20
10
20
12
20
14
Retained SME securitisation
Placed SME securitisation
Total SME securitisation
issuance
Figure 10: European SME securitisation
issuance by retention (in € billions)
Source: AFME; Note: since 2007, the total issuance can be
split between ‘retained’ and ‘placed’, where ‘placed’ refers to
securitisations placed with investors on the primary market
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19. Veugelers (2011).
tively underdeveloped in most countries given
their general level of economic development.
Second, financial markets still remain predomi-
nantly national, as measured by high home bias
in investment patterns. The two issues are linked
but call for different policies. While the response
in the first case should be to improve conditions
for capital market intermediation in every country,
the second issue should be addressed by har-
monising and standardising the national financial
intermediation rules and practices.
CMU should combine the benefits of deepening
and integrating financial markets. Both are ben-
eficial and mutually reinforcing. Integration across
borders, not least in equity markets, brings eco-
nomic risk mitigation and reduces the financial-
sovereign vicious circle. It also increases
competition and allows for scale effects, which
should help to generally reduce funding costs.
This integration will also contribute to the devel-
opment of markets. Deeper capital markets, in
turn, offer a greater variety of funding options and
easier access to finance for different kinds of cor-
porations. They also increase the options for
households to save and invest.
Most SMEs will remain reliant on banks for their
external funding and will not be directly
impacted by CMU. However, CMU should have
material impact to broaden financing options for
high-growth companies of all sizes and dynamic
medium-sized firms. It is misleading to charac-
terise CMU as a project to target primarily SMEs.
SMEs will continue to rely predominantly on
banks, even though larger SMEs might gain capital
market access through better-developed corpo-
rate loan securitisation. Large corporations
already have decent access to capital markets.
Where CMU offers most potential is for high-growth
companies, which lack access to risk capital19 and
for medium-sized companies, which currently
have much more limited access to capital markets
than large groups.
 To boost the role of capital markets in financial
intermediation, the perspectives of savers,
financial intermediaries and non-financial firms
are all important. The shape of the financial
ecosystem depends on decisions taken by all
three categories and the framework conditions
that affect them. Changes in the funding mix for
non-financial corporations have implications for
financial intermediaries as well as for savers. For
example, strengthening equity funding implies
that investors need to accept higher risk and
longer maturities. While the current pattern of
European savings in low-risk, short-maturity
instruments is probably rooted in preferences and
demographic structures, it is also encouraged by
specific tax and regulatory policies. These policies
should be amended to further the objective of
better funding for the European economy, includ-
ing through equity instruments. Similarly, corpo-
rate governance and ownership patterns that are
dominated by family control in several EU member
states might contribute to companies’ reluctance
to tap external sources of finance, especially
those outside banks. But a more favourable policy
framework could incentivise a significant number
of companies to change their financing patterns
in a manner that would be more conducive to
investment and job creation. Financial intermedi-
ation and in particular banks are also central.
Banks perform important functions in terms of
maturity transformation, financial engineering and
the overcoming of information asymmetries, and
they have the capacity to deal with regulatory and
supervisory differences between countries.
Increasing harmonisation across EU countries
could allow other organisations or even savers to
engage directly in cross-border activity more
easily. However, this also means that non-banks
take certain risks, including in terms of maturity
transformation.
Deeper and more integrated capital markets
should spread economic risk, but potential finan-
cial stability risks need to be managed. The eco-
nomic literature and the empirical evidence are
clear that financial integration is a good way to
spread economic risk. But the emergence of new
financial players also raises financial stability con-
cerns, especially when they engage in maturity
transformation and/or financial engineering. There
are risks at the level of instruments, institutions
‘Deeper capital markets offer a greater variety of funding options and easier access to finance
for corporations. They also increase the options for households to save and invest.’
09
BR U EGE L
POLICY
CONTRIBUTIONCAPITAL MARKETS UNION: A VISION FOR THE LONG TERM
20. Based on membership
of the Federation of Euro-
pean Securities Exchanges
(FESE) and the World Feder-
ation of Exchanges (WFE).
These groups are, respec-
tively, BATS, Nasdaq and the
New York Stock Exchange
(part of ICE) in the US; and
the stock exchange groups
headquartered respectively
in Amsterdam (Euronext),
Athens, Bucharest, Bulgaria,
Cyprus, Frankfurt
(Deutsche Börse), Ireland,
Luxembourg, Madrid, Malta,
Stockholm (part of Nasdaq
OMX), Vienna (CEE Stock
Exchange), and Warsaw in
the EU. This list does not
include the separate stock
exchanges in Bratislava and
Zagreb, which do not appear
on the FESE membership
list.
21. These included a brain-
storming workshop held at
Bruegel on 24 November
2014, a presentation by the
authors at a meeting of the
EU Financial Services Com-
mittee on 20 January 2015,
participation of the authors
and their Bruegel col-
leagues in a range of confer-
ences and other events
organised by third parties in
a number of different EU
member states, and numer-
ous bilateral conversations
with interlocutors in acade-
mia, the public policy com-
munity, the private sector
and other segments of
European civil society. The
authors are also grateful to
all those who have given
feedback on early drafts of
this paper.
22. Among others, Wright
(2014) notes that “there is
a striking inconsistency in
data in some parts of the
[EU] capital markets”.
would be positive in all member states even
though the magnitude would vary. Local financial
ecosystems now work through private equity and
investment communities, not local financial infra-
structure such as stock exchanges. To reap effi-
ciency gains, CMU should be allowed to disrupt
currently protected national infrastructure plat-
forms and other entrenched financial market
structures.
CMU goes beyond a narrow definition of financial
services policy. Financing patterns are deter-
mined not only by securities, conduct and pru-
dential rules that are specific to the financial
sector, but also by other policies that shape the
behaviour of companies, savers and financial
intermediaries, such as those that govern the
sharing of information and data, insolvency frame-
works and tax policies. This broad scope is
reflected in the policy proposals of the following
section. 
4 POLICY AGENDA
The following recommendations are based on the
analytical framework presented in the previous
section, and on the current stage of development
of capital markets policy in the EU. They also
follow extensive discussions with a wide range of
stakeholders21 and a review of available surveys
and evidence. It is not implied that all the following
items must be delivered in full for the CMU to be a
long-term success, nor indeed that this list is
exhaustive – other significant initiatives may be
needed, possibly in the wake of new technologi-
cal developments. Nevertheless, these items all
appear important if the goals of the CMU as
expressed by the European Commission and ten-
tatively defined in this paper’s introduction are to
be met.
System-wide surveillance. Most EU member
states have a long tradition of monitoring risks in
their national banking systems. In the euro area,
the implementation of banking union offers the
prospect of much-improved supranational bank-
ing risk monitoring. However, the surveillance of a
more complex financial system in which the role
of banks could gradually become less dominant
implies new challenges, which call for an ade-
quate infrastructure22. This echoes legitimate con-
and the system. While not identical to those from
banking, financial stability risks from capital mar-
kets and non-bank finance need to be adequately
monitored and, if necessary, mitigated through
appropriate regulation. Thus, financial stability
considerations should be an integral part of CMU.
This raises questions about regulation, supervi-
sion and resolution and the allocation of these
tasks to relevant institutions.
To achieve a different pattern of household
investment, protection of savers is fundamental.
Households and savers will only invest in finan-
cial products if they are transparent and comply
with clear and reliable rules. Deposits in the EU
enjoy the extraordinary privilege of a high deposit
insurance guarantee. By contrast, other forms of
financial investment have much more limited pro-
tection if any, and are often opaque and difficult
to understand. Adequate safeguards for savers
and investors should therefore be an important
part of CMU and might require a strengthening of
both legislation and supervision. Consumer pro-
tection also needs to be adequately calibrated so
that it does not stifle risk taking and innovation.
All member states will gain from better access to
finance and better returns for savers, even
though some will host more financial-sector
activity than others. In an integrated market,
financial firms tend to concentrate in a limited
number of locations, especially in terms of whole-
sale market activity. The US financial system, for
example, is dominated by the role of New York and
a few other spots such as Boston, Chicago, and the
San Francisco Bay Area. Yet, Texas or Ohio can still
prosper without a capital market of their own, or
even locally-headquartered large banks. There are
only three stock exchanges in the US, as opposed
to 13 in the EU20. Similarly, CMU does not mean
that all member states have to gain in terms of the
development of their own financial services sec-
tors. On the contrary, comparative advantage
should be allowed to play its role. From this per-
spective, CMU would have a distributional impact
on EU member states, given the different
strengths of their comparative advantage in finan-
cial services. This distributional impact of CMU,
however, should not shift attention from its more
significant impact on non-financial corporate fund-
ing and improved saving opportunities, which
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cerns about ‘shadow banking’ and the possibility
of financial risks migrating to parts of the financial
system where they might escape public monitor-
ing. New initiatives are needed both on data col-
lection, which currently tends to be fragmented
across different systems, and on institutional
architecture, a particular challenge given the
strong interdependencies between the euro area
(which accounts for a majority of the EU’s econ-
omy), the UK (which hosts the main hub of EU cap-
ital markets) and other non-euro member states.
One solution might be to beef up the capacity of
the European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB) to col-
lect and analyse granular data and thus to bring
Europe closer to the vision of a holistic real-time
‘risk map’23, in conjunction with efforts led by the
Bank for International Settlements (BIS) and
Financial Stability Board (FSB) at the global level.
Financial product regulation. In the wake of ear-
lier efforts to move towards a single rulebook for
capital markets regulation, the EU should continue
to work towards a clearly articulated, simple and
effective regulatory framework for those financial
market activities that cannot simply be left to the
discipline of the markets. This should include the
completion of projects that have already been
announced or are at various stages of develop-
ment by the European Commission and other EU
institutions, including on European Long-Term
Investment Funds (ELTIFs)24, securitisation25, the
revision of the Prospectus Directive26 and private
placements27. It should also include additional ini-
tiatives such as a revision of the EU framework for
Undertakings for Collective Investment in Trans-
ferable Securities (UCITS), the reference fund
status for retail investment in the EU, in order to
enable direct investment by UCITS in loans origi-
nated by banks, because the current curbs on
such investment appear excessive from the
standpoint of both financial stability and investor
protection. The EU should also further replace
directives with regulations to close loopholes,
reduce national ‘gold-plating’ (the addition of idio-
syncratic national provisions in the legislative
transposition of EU directives) and ensure pan-EU
regulatory consistency. Such regulatory actions
form the bulk of the concrete policy proposals
described in the European Commission’s green
paper on CMU. It should however be kept in mind
that while necessary, these measures would be
far from sufficient to enable significant develop-
ment and integration of EU capital markets.
Regulation of financial entities. In addition to the
regulation of financial products and activities,
many financial firms are subject to specific regu-
latory, supervisory and in some cases resolution
frameworks that impact on their role in the devel-
opment of EU financial markets. Such regulation
is generally motivated by concerns about finan-
cial stability, given the specific nature of financial
systemic risk, and/or about financial conduct, not
least because of the multiplicity of information
asymmetries that exist in finance. In this respect,
legislation currently under discussion on banking
structural reform is of particular importance28. The
detailed analysis of this proposal is beyond the
scope of this paper. However, it would seem appro-
priate to take into account the CMU’s objectives of
capital markets development in the legislative dis-
cussion and finalisation of this text. Other signifi-
cant bank-related regulatory projects with
significant implications for capital markets include
further EU implementation of the global Basel III
Accord, and the future EU transposition of the
forthcoming global standards on banks’ Total
Loss-Absorbing Capacity (TLAC). EU legislators
could contemplate delaying completion of bank-
ing structural reform legislation so that closely-
related TLAC concerns can be incorporated.
Aside from banks, insurers are crucial participants
in European capital markets as investors. The
ongoing implementation of the new Solvency 2
regime should be completed in 2016 as currently
planned, to minimise regulatory uncertainty. How-
ever, this package deters investment by insurers
in riskier market segments such as equities, under
a framework that is largely inspired by the pru-
dential regulation of banks and does not ade-
quately take into account the longer maturities of
insurance liabilities. EU legislators should con-
sider rapid review of Solvency 2 in order to achieve
a better balance between the need to maintain the
long-term solvency of insurers and the concern
not to unnecessarily hamper their potential as
long-term risk-taking investors in the European
economy. Also, the EU should consider adjust-
ments to regulations adopted in the heat of the
crisis – for example, those on alternative invest-
ment funds and on credit rating agencies – in
23. See eg Issing and
Krahnen (2009).
24. The European Commis-
sion published a legislative
proposal on ELTIFs in June
2013, which is currently
going through the EU leg-
islative process.
25. A consultation is cur-
rently underway on “simple,
transparent and standard-
ised securitisation” (Euro-
pean Commission, 2015c).
26. On this too, a consulta-
tion was started at the time
of publication of the CMU
green paper (European
Commission, 2015d).
27. See a proposal outline
for a harmonised single EU
private placement regime in
Houmann & Gleeson
(2015).
28. European Commission
(2014).
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29. AFME (2015a), Figure 1.
30. Maijoor (2015).
31. Judgement of the Court
in case C-270/12, UK vs Par-
liament and Council, 22
January 2014, analysed eg
in Pelkmans and Simoncini
(2014).
32. Both proposals, referred
to as a ‘European System of
Listing Authorities’ and a
‘European System of EU
Fund Approval’ respectively,
are in Houmann and
Gleeson (2015).
order to take into account the impact of their early
implementation on EU capital markets activity.
One category of intermediaries that European pol-
icymakers have often tried to actively promote is
venture capital (VC) funds. The development of
VCs is seen as desirable because it is associated
with high-growth technical innovators. However,
the record of policies aimed at stimulating VC
development through provision of public money,
either in the form of public VCs or co-investment
of public funds with private-sector VCs, is not com-
pelling. The main reason is that the control mech-
anisms that are inherent in any use of public
funding easily enter into conflict with the high-
risk, high-return logic of VC investment, including
the way VC investments are chosen, and even
more so the way they might be discontinued when
the company receiving investment is not suffi-
ciently successful. In addition, the injection of sig-
nificant amounts of public money into
comparatively small VC markets in individual
member states has often led to market and price
distortions which have ended up penalising rather
than helping the most innovation-oriented VCs.
Thus, the EU should refrain from throwing public
money at the VC market, including though the
European Investment Fund (EIF). The best way to
encourage a vibrant European VC industry is to
work on their investment environment rather than
interfere directly with their activity. Our proposals,
below, should contribute to such an approach,
because they focus on the framework conditions
in which capital markets can develop.
EU-level regulatory implementation and enforce-
ment. Overwhelming evidence from market par-
ticipants suggests that the current regime of
national implementation and enforcement of even
the most-harmonised EU regulations results in
diverging practices and market fragmentation.
Companies and investors cannot simply trans-
pose their experience of regulations in one
member state to another, and need country-spe-
cific legal advice in each member state. In a recent
survey, investors cited the complexity of such dif-
ferences and the discrepancies in rules (resulting
from national rules and from gold-plating of EU
laws) as the two most important barriers to invest-
ment in the EU29. The creation of the European
Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA) in 2011
provides an existing infrastructure for the imple-
mentation and enforcement of EU legislation in a
consistent manner, but ESMA needs to be further
empowered to act as an effective regulator rather
than a weak coordination mechanism. The chair-
man of ESMA recently noted that “Given the
breadth and complexity of the single rulebook,
regulators need to make many choices regarding
their supervision, including the interpretation of
the rules and the intensity of supervision. Diver-
sity in these choices will have the result that the
single rulebook will not in fact be seen as such by
investors and market participants”30. An EU Court
of Justice ruling in 2014 provided additional legal
security on the granting of authority to ESMA on
matters of capital markets regulation31 and ESMA
is already the sole supervisor for certain cate-
gories of capital market participants, including
credit rating agencies and trade repositories.
Specifically, the authority to approve new secu-
rities issuance and to authorise funds under leg-
islation such as UCITS and AIFM may be
transferred to ESMA, with a transfer back to
national authorities of much of the actual regula-
tory work but as part of a binding EU network in
which ESMA would have effective policy control32.
Other areas, such as EU competition policy and (in
the euro area) the prudential supervision of banks
within the Single Supervisory Mechanism, provide
examples of such patterns of delegation that
ensure both regulatory consistency and a large
degree of operational decentralisation.
Similarly, the enforcement of EU capital markets
regulation should be at least partly pooled at the
level of ESMA with wide operational delegation
back to the national authorities, in order to ensure
that sanctions for non-observance are not simply
evaded by market participants by moving their
activity from stricter to more lenient EU jurisdic-
‘Overwhelming evidence from market participants suggests that the current regime of national
implementation and enforcement of even the most-harmonised EU regulations results in
diverging practices and market fragmentation.’
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tions (a practice often described as ‘forum-shop-
ping’), for example in relation to rules on securi-
ties issuance and investor protection. Similarly,
obligations related to system-wide risk monitor-
ing, including the requirement to report derivatives
transactions to central repositories, are currently
enforced very differently in different member
states, and a transfer of enforcement responsibil-
ity to ESMA would result both in lower costs and in
much improved compliance. The possibility of
coexistence of national and European enforce-
ment regimes should be carefully assessed, but
must not be considered an intractable problem per
se. The long-standing situation in the US in which
federal and state-level enforcement frameworks
operate simultaneously, especially in states with
significant financial activity such as New York,
shows that such coexistence can be managed. In
parallel, the Commission should be more assertive
in its task of single market enforcement through
infringement procedures when needed, in cases
of national legislation that is not compliant with
the EU framework.
Of course, such regulatory centralisation would
require decision at the appropriate political level,
as was the case when the decision to create ESMA
and the other ESAs was made in June 2009. It
would also probably entail reform of ESMA itself.
Section 5 further discusses some of the related
challenges.
Accounting and auditing. Financial information
has been justifiably described as the lifeblood of
capital markets33, and the availability of high-qual-
ity and comparable financial information on
issuers across the EU is a crucial condition for the
success of CMU. The EU adoption of International
Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS), decided in
2002 and implemented in 2005-06, was a huge
step in this direction, but more needs to be done.
There remain wide differences between member
states in IFRS implementation and enforcement
and in other aspects of financial disclosure. Two
main reforms should be considered in this area.
First, responsibility for IFRS enforcement should
be granted to a newly created office of the Euro-
pean Chief Accountant (in reference to the equiv-
alent authority in the US, which is hosted by the
Securities and Exchange Commission). This office,
which could be envisaged either as part of ESMA or
as a new organisation, would be given functional
authority over the existing national competent
bodies34 for purposes of IFRS implementation.
Second, the loopholes in EU auditing legislation
(including after its latest revision in 2014) should
be closed to constitute a genuine single rulebook,
and the supervision of audit firms should be
pooled at European level in a specialised agency
that could be subject to oversight by ESMA (in a
relationship similar to that between the US Public
Company Accounting Oversight Board and the
Securities and Exchange Commission).
In addition, the European Commission should fur-
ther explore the costs and benefits of reforming
accounting obligations that are not currently
within the scope of IFRS, namely the financial
statements of individual entities and of unlisted
companies. While there might be a case for har-
monisation35, this should be robustly assessed on
the basis of the subsidiarity principle. It should
also be considered in liaison with proposals to
reform corporate taxation, because tax account-
ing is one of the main drivers of non-IFRS financial
reporting in many if not all EU member states: a
move towards harmonisation of the corporate
income tax base would have obvious spillovers in
terms of harmonisation of single-entity account-
ing requirements36.
Corporate credit information. Alongside financial
information covered by accounting and auditing
frameworks, information about corporate risk and
credit is similarly important in order to stimulate
market-based investment. Even though situations
differ in member states, capital market partici-
pants in the EU other than banks and central
banks currently have only limited access to credit
information about SMEs and even many large
companies (aside from the limited number that
are rated by credit rating agencies). The European
Commission has started work on improving the
availability and quality of such information, as
announced in the CMU green paper. But this raises
issues of confidentiality and market structure, and
should also be connected with the ambitious ECB
project of building an analytical credit dataset
(known as AnaCredit) which would also cover a
large part of the SME credit landscape37.
33. See eg Levitt (1999).
34. Depending on national
circumstances, these are
currently either accounting
enforcement units within
securities regulators (as in
France, Italy, the
Netherlands and Spain), or
hosted by other specialised
public authorities (eg the
Financial Reporting Council
in the UK), or private-sector
bodies empowered by law
(eg the Financial Reporting
Enforcement Panel in
Germany).
35. For example, Maijoor
(2015) argues that “we
should consider moving to
a common accounting
language for SMEs that
would like to grow and get a
broader investor base. That
language should be based
on IFRS but not as
extensive as the standard
set of IFRS”.
36. It should be noted
however that the current EU
project for a Common
Consolidated Corporate Tax
Base (CCCTB) would be only
an option for companies,
and its adoption would thus
not have obvious impact in
terms of accounting
frameworks.
37. See eg Damia and Israël
(2014).
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38. See in particular
https://www.ecb.europa.eu/
paym/t2s/about/about/html
/index.en.html and
https://www.ecb.europa.eu/
paym/t2s/about/html/giova
nnini.en.html for a
description by the ECB of
the complexity of clearing
and settlement, the
Giovannini barriers, and the
expected impact of T2S.
39. See eg Djankov,
McLiesh and Shleifer
(2007), Davydenko and
Franks (2008) and Plantin,
Thesmar and Tirole (2013).
40. See a recent set of
proposals in AFME (2015b).
Financial infrastructure. As noted in the previous
section, the European landscape for trading and
post-trading infrastructure is marked by extraor-
dinary complexity and fragmentation. This is due
in large part to the complex legacies of past
national systems, and also to the lingering sym-
bolic potency of stock exchanges as emblems of
national economic strength and sovereignty. In
the early 2000s, the European Commission pro-
moted a strategic review that resulted in two land-
mark reports by a group chaired by Alberto
Giovannini and identified 15 ‘Giovannini barriers’
to efficient cross-border clearing and settlement
in the EU. Even after initiatives including the adop-
tion in 2014 of a new EU Regulation on Central
Securities Depositories and the creation by the
ECB of the T2S (Target2Securities) platform for
securities settlements, many of these barriers still
remain38. As identified in the Giovannini reports,
the EU should aim to reduce or eliminate the cur-
rent difference between cross-border securities
transactions and transactions within a single EU
country. The specific but systemically important
challenge posed by the prudential supervision of
derivatives clearing houses (known in the EU as
CCPs, or central counter-parties) is discussed in
the next section.
Insolvency and financial restructuring frame-
works. A growing literature has identified insol-
vency law and debt-restructuring practices as
major determinants of corporate credit39. In the EU,
the understanding of this issue has been recently
enhanced by observation of significant insol-
vency reforms in countries under assistance pro-
grammes, such as Ireland. A better insolvency
framework allows for a better re-allocation of cap-
ital and more growth. In many EU member states,
inefficient and antiquated frameworks for insol-
vency and debt restructuring deter corporate
investment and high-risk segments of credit (such
as mezzanine and high-yield debt), because
investors and creditors are insufficiently pro-
tected in case of insolvency, and the conduct of
the insolvency process fails to maximise the
prospects for asset recovery. Additional ineffi-
‘A better insolvency framework allows for a better re-allocation of capital and more growth. In
many EU member states, inefficient and antiquated frameworks for insolvency and debt
restructuring deter corporate investment and high-risk segments of credit.’
ciency arises from the lack of consistency of insol-
vency provisions across borders, but the first-
order issue appears to be the inadequacies of
national insolvency frameworks in terms of the
laws themselves and the way they are imple-
mented through courts and the work of spe-
cialised service providers and professions. In this
area, full harmonisation is unrealistic even over
the long-term, given deeply embedded differ-
ences in national legal frameworks. However, the
EU could stimulate a coordinated reform process
with common principles and harmonisation of a
limited set of relevant aspects40, with appropriate
benchmarking and monitoring at the EU level. In
parallel, the creation of a specific EU insolvency
regime for banks, administered by an EU court,
appears indispensable in the medium term to
complete the legal framework of banking union
and especially the vision of a Single Resolution
Mechanism.
Taxation of savings and investment. Since taxa-
tion always acts as a key driver of investor behav-
iour, differences in frameworks for the taxation of
savings are a contributor to market fragmentation
and to the difficulty of creating powerful, simple,
pan-European market segments for investment.
In many member states, tax frameworks also con-
tribute to the orientation of savings towards low-
risk, short-maturity instruments. Because EU-wide
unanimity is likely to be unattainable, joint proj-
ects for the taxation of savings could be envisaged
by subsets of member states using the enhanced
cooperation procedure. This procedure has
already formed the basis for the initiative to create
a European Financial Transactions Tax (FTT), but
unfortunately this project still appears ill-
designed. Protracted discussions over the FTT and,
if eventually adopted, its implementation might
act as a brake on investment, with detrimental
economic consequences. EU member states
should instead focus their energies on har-
monised taxation of savings, reforming the tax dis-
advantage given to equity relative to debt and
other initiatives that could stimulate investment
and market development.
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Possible further items. As mentioned above, this
list is not intended to be exhaustive. In particular,
reforms of pensions and housing policies could
have very significant impact on capital markets,
for example with the creation of pan-European
pension fund systems or covered-bond markets.
However, these developments would have social
and political implications far beyond concerns
about capital markets development.
Consequently, we consider them to be beyond the
remit of the CMU agenda. However, CMU-related
aspects may usefully be considered in relevant
future discussions.
5 IMPLEMENTATION AND SEQUENCING
Maintaining the momentum. A welcome momen-
tum on CMU as a high-level priority for the entire
EU has been created. It is important to maintain
this momentum through adequate calibration and
sequencing of future actions. The delivery of
‘quick wins’ on ongoing projects of financial prod-
uct regulation (ELTIFs, securitisation, the prospec-
tus directive and private placement) is important
in this regard. However, these will be no substitute
for more ambitious initiatives with transformative
long-term impact that would justify the ‘union’
label. CMU, if ambitiously executed, can eventu-
ally deliver tangible benefits to EU citizens in
terms of more jobs, growth, and a more stable
financial system. The challenge will be to keep the
momentum going despite the structural nature of
the effort and the technical nature of the project,
which makes it difficult to explain to broader audi-
ences. Fortunately, the new EU consensus, which
recognises the need for stronger capital markets
as a way to make the financial system both more
efficient and more resilient, is supportive. How-
ever, the political and technical obstacles should
not be underestimated. Given the complexity of
some of the issues listed in the previous section,
it is not realistic to expect a detailed blueprint on
all of them by the second half of 2015, when the
Commission is expected to publish a CMU action
plan.
Staged process. As a consequence, the Commis-
sion’s action plan could combine firm policy
announcements that demonstrate commitment
with the launch of processes for further study on
the most difficult and complex items.
The area of accounting and auditing may be
judged particularly promising for a firm policy
announcement later in 2015, especially the two
main proposals outlined in the previous section
on IFRS enforcement and audit regulation and
oversight. The need for high-quality comparable
information across the EU can hardly be disputed
as a precondition for CMU. Financial practitioners
recognise that the current policy framework does
not achieve this aim. The EU can capitalise on the
successful adoption of IFRS a decade ago to claim
legitimacy in this area. Furthermore, reform is
made more urgent by the need for cross-border
accounting and auditing consistency in the euro
area to support the operation of banking union.
Early commitments would also be desirable on
other proposals made in the previous section,
such as on system-wide monitoring, listing
authority, fund approval and enforcement.
To tackle the most complex areas, the EU could
create parallel processes of analysis and devel-
opment of policy proposals in the following five
areas: corporate credit information; financial infra-
structure; insolvency and debt restructuring;
financial investment taxation; and the retrospec-
tive review of the aggregate impact of capital mar-
kets regulation passed in the last decade, echoing
the Commission's intent to undertake this type of
retrospective analysis41. Given the complex and
technical nature of these topics, and also the fact
that they span the remits of several commission-
ers and directorates-general within the Commis-
sion, it would be advisable to entrust autonomous
taskforces with the analysis and the develop-
ment of corresponding policy proposals. Their
specific design and governance might vary for dif-
ferent issues and should take into consideration
past processes that were judged successful42. The
action plan should also set target dates for these
taskforces to deliver detailed proposals, say in
late 2016 or early 2017, so that subsequent leg-
islative implementation could be well underway
by the time the current EU legislative term ends in
mid-2019.
Institutional issues. Many of the policy proposals
in the previous section imply institutional
changes. They envisage an expansion of the
authority granted to both ESMA and the ESRB, and
the creation of new EU-level bodies, which may be
41. Hill (2015) declared his
intention “to take a close
look at the cumulative
effect of the laws we have
passed to make sure we
have got the balance right
between reducing risk and
fostering growth”.
42. Examples of successful
task forces include, at the
EU level, the Giovannini
Group and the Larosière
report, both of which were
supported directly by the
European Commission; and
in individual member
states, the Independent
Commission on Banking in
the UK, which was sup-
ported by an autonomous
temporary secretariat com-
posed of officials seconded
from several government
departments and agencies.
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needed to ensure adequate independence and/or
specialised expertise (for example for the over-
sight of audit firms).
There have been several expressions of concern
in early debates about CMU, particularly in the UK,
about the risk that proposals for institutional
change might work against achieving the aims of
CMU. For example, the UK House of Lords argued
that “any attempt to establish a system of pan-EU
supervision would not only be contentious, but
could prove an unhelpful distraction from the nec-
essary reforms that Capital Markets Union is seek-
ing to bring about”43. However, this argument
misleadingly paints the institutional question as
black-and-white, and ignores the fact that ESMA is
already mandated to supervise credit rating agen-
cies and trade repositories on a pan-EU basis.
In reality, the institutional question is of a prac-
tical, not ideological nature. Some CMU aims can
be attained without changes to the respective
institutions’ mandates, and some cannot. This is
best determined case by case. Both the present
and the future situations are and will be hybrids
between two extremes, in which supervision is
respectively all-national (an unnecessary step
backwards from the status quo) or all-European
(an unrealistic and unnecessary prospect that
would sit oddly with the subsidiarity principle).
A more helpful distinction is between prudential
supervision, which is typically coupled to a reso-
lution framework with possible fiscal implications,
and other aspects of financial supervision such as
authorisations of funds and of securities
issuances, and enforcement of capital markets
rules. In the current phase of EU integration, the
former could be pooled within the banking-union
area, but pooling across the entire EU appears
more problematic, given potential fiscal implica-
tions for which taxpayers are the final backstop.
By contrast, EU-level pooling of authority over the
regulation of financial conduct would not
“impinge in any way on the fiscal responsibili-
ties of member states” (to quote from the legisla-
tion that created ESMA and the other ESAs). The
logic that led EU member states, including the UK,
to support the creation of ESMA has not changed,
and an adjustment of ESMA authority should not
be considered intrinsically contentious if it can
help to address certain issues better than the cur-
rent division of labour among national authorities.
The current setup of ESMA and other EU-level
agencies should not be considered untouchable.
On the contrary, it needs change. The funding
mechanism envisaged for the ESAs has not func-
tioned effectively44, and their governance has
proved less than optimal in terms of effectiveness,
independence and quality of the decision-making
process45. The reform of the ESAs’ governance
and funding, which is specifically expressed as
part of the mandate given to the commissioner for
financial services by the Commission’s Presi-
dent46, should thus be closely coordinated with
the development of the CMU project. In the case of
ESMA, the increased concentration of capital mar-
kets activity (though not of the economic benefits
of strong capital markets) in a limited subset of
member states raises particular questions about
a framework in which each member state is cur-
rently represented on the ESMA supervisory board
by its national securities regulator.
As mentioned in the previous section, the pru-
dential oversight of CCPs is a special case. The
recent reforms of derivatives markets have
increased the systemic importance of CCPs, and
their implementation is still far from complete. The
reform agenda itself, as defined at the global level
during the September 2009 G20 Pittsburgh
Summit, has not taken into account cross-border
interdependencies in a fully adequate manner.
Thus, the challenges posed by CCPs with signifi-
cant international activity, such as those affiliated
with the London Stock Exchange and ICE groups
in the UK, raise both global and intra-EU coordina-
tion questions. It would be advisable for the EU to
find answers to such questions to be delivered at
the global level, difficult as that may be, before it
envisages their permanent settlement in a con-
‘Some CMU aims can be attained without changes to the institutions’ mandates, and some
cannot. This is best determined case by case. Both the present and the future situations are and
will be hybrids between two extremes: all-national supervision, and all-European supervision.’
43. House of Lords (2015),
paragraph 75.
44. See eg the joint letter
sent by the Chairs of the
three ESAs to the ECOFIN
president on 5 November
2014, available at
https://eiopa.europa.eu/Pub
lications/Other%20Docume
nts/ESAs_2014-
41___Joint_ESAs_letter_to_EU_C
ouncil_Presidency_-
_ESAs_Budget_2015_.pdf.
45. The most striking
example has arguably been
the ill-starred stress testing
of EU banks coordinated by
the European Banking
Authority (EBA) in 2011,
which was marred by
governance shortcomings
in spite of the best efforts of
a competent EBA leadership
and staff.
46. Juncker (2015b).
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sistent manner inside the EU. In this respect, the
best way to avoid politically challenging debates
about supranational supervision, be it at EU or
global level, would be to devise and adopt strictly
rules-based resolution mechanisms which give no
discretion to authorities, and distribute losses
automatically among market participants in the
unlikely event of a systemic failure. While such
rules-based mechanisms cannot be entirely prac-
tical for banks, they might be better suited to the
distinguishing features of international CCPs.
International consistency. The economic impact
of CMU on the EU depends in part on its interna-
tional openness. As the financial services commis-
sioner recently put it, “the CMU is not about closing
doors to the outside world. On the contrary, we want
to see more investment from outside investors”47.
This implies that, as an indispensable complement
to its CMU agenda, the EU should champion inter-
national financial regulatory standards and other
global initiatives as it has done previously – not
least its landmark adoption of IFRS a decade ago.
The EU should look critically at past episodes, for
example, related to the design and implementation
of the Alternative Investment Fund Managers Direc-
tive (AIFMD) or the European Market Infrastructure
Regulation (EMIR), which triggered debates about
discrimination against non-EU service providers.
The EU should be exemplary in complying with
global standards. It should fully support global
bodies with agendas and mandates that are
aligned with the objectives of CMU, in particular the
Financial Stability Board (FSB), Committee on Pay-
ments and Market Infrastructures (CPMI) and Inter-
national Organisation of Securities Commissions
(IOSCO). Far from being driven by idealism, such
global commitments would respond to the EU's
hard-nosed vested interest in favour of an open and
rules-based international financial order.
47. Hill (2015).
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